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This paper examines the role of social safety-net 
programs in Bangladesh run by the government and 
nongovernmental organizations to mitigate seasonal 
deprivation in the country’s highly vulnerable northwest 
region. Specifically, the paper explores whether social 
safety nets are limited to averting seasonal deprivation or 
can also address seasonality of income and employment 
more generally. Using a recent survey from the greater 
Rangpur (northwest) region, the paper finds that social 
safety nets have a positive effect on mitigating both 
seasonal and non-seasonal food deprivation. The results 
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are robust, owing to the recent expanded coverage of 
social safety-net programs run by nongovernmental 
organizations active in the region. But given the annual 
recurrence of monga (seasonal food insecurity) in the 
northwest region owing to agricultural seasonality 
and an overwhelming dependence on agriculture for 
livelihoods, social safety nets are not a reliable tool for 
monga eradication. Programs are also needed to promote 
the income and productivity of the poor through 
diversification of income and employment.  Can Social Safety Nets Alleviate Seasonal Deprivation? 
Evidence from Northwest Bangladesh
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Can Social Safety Nets Alleviate Seasonal Deprivation? 
Evidence from Northwest Bangladesh 
1.  Introduction 
Poor households in every corner of the world are vulnerable to both internal and external shocks.  
In Bangladesh, one recurring internal shock is seasonal famine, known as monga, which strikes the 
greater Rangpur (northwest) region each year with varying intensity during September–November 
(Ashwin–Kartik  in  Bengali),  corresponding  to  the  pre-harvest  season  for  Aman  rice.  Lack  of 
agricultural activity during this period essentially leads to unemployment among the vast majority of 
rural people.  
   Most poor people in greater Rangpur live marginally on low-paying wages or other income-
generating activities—mostly agriculture-related—with little or no savings, insurance, or access to 
formal credit.  Predictably, they often go unemployed during the monga season.  To maintain a 
minimum livelihood, many are forced to sell their standing crops or labor in advance at lower-than-
market price; some sell their assets, and others borrow from informal moneylenders at an exorbitant 
rate  (Khandker  2011).    Many  others  migrate  to  other  parts  of  the  country  for  income-earning 
opportunities (Khandker, Khalily, and Samad, forthcoming; Chowdhury, Mobarak, and Bryan 2009).   
   While poor households adopt various coping strategies during monga, these may not suffice 
to stave off starvation or food rationing.  In this recurring crisis, governments and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) intervene with various social-protection or safety-net measures that provide 
these poor households assistance in the form of cash, food support, and income opportunities.  
Most such programs are designed to provide households immediate support during monga, while 
some are long-term interventions.  
  Safety-net  programs  designed  to address  seasonal  deprivation alone are  not  confined  to 
Bangladesh.  In most countries where the greater segment of the rural population depends on an 3 
 
agriculture-based economy, income seasonality is both common and somewhat predictable.  In a 
recent study of four African countries, Devereux (2009) shows that a variety of social-protection 
experiments  had  varying  degrees  of  success.    These  programs  have  included  (i)  a  productivity-
enhancing safety net implemented in Ghana in the 1980s to promote household food security and 
reduce  the  seasonal  hunger  gap,  (ii)  food-for-work  and  vulnerable-group-feeding  programs  in 
Namibia in the 1990s, (iii) emergency cash transfers in Malawi in the mid–2000s in response to 
localized crop failures, and (iv) cash transfers in Ethiopia in the mid-2000s to cover a hunger gap of 
four-to-six months and household extension packages.           
   Social protection is recognized globally as a strategy to safeguard the economic security of 
the poor.  It provides support to the vulnerable and the poorest in order to address the causes—not 
simply the symptoms—of poverty.  According to Holzmann and Grosh (2008), a social-protection 
policy is a risk-reducing instrument that includes public policies assisting individuals, households, 
and communities in better managing risk, thus ensuring a minimum living standard for poverty-
stricken people.  
    Safety-net measures can be categorized according to their objectives: cash- or food-transfer 
programs, price subsidies, provision of human capital, public-works programs, and microcredit and 
informal insurance programs (Babu 2003).  The extent of these programs’ coverage depends on the 
extent of hardship of vulnerable households, as well as availability of funds.  However, an apparent 
small fund transfer in a safety-net program does not necessarily mean a small net gain; for example, 
small gains in consumption due to a safety net may imply a net gain for an aversion of high risk by 
households (especially those due to subsistence constraints in developing countries).  An example of 
such a high risk measure could be withdrawing children from school.  In such circumstances, social 
insurance or social safety-net programs may enhance the welfare of the poor by providing a less 4 
 
costly, consumption-smoothing mechanism relative to alternative, desperate measures (e.g., Chetty 
and Looney 2006).  
    A  priori,  there  are  good  reasons  for  introducing  social  safety-net  programs  to  mitigate 
monga  and  other  proximate  causes  of  seasonality  of  poverty.    Thus,  assessing  their  benefits  is 
essential for better targeting and resource allocation.  One approach to assessing such benefits is to 
quantify  their  safety-net  (social-protection)  roles  against  their  income-augmenting  roles.    Even 
though safety-net measures are geared toward mitigating economic stress caused by shocks, it is 
possible that easing economic stress may have a positive effect on assets and longer-term income; 
that is, a targeted program may reduce chronic, as well as transitory, poverty.  But in some cases, the 
short-term benefits of safety-net programs may exceed long-term ones.  Ravallion, van de Walle, and 
Gautam (1995), for example, showed that the effect of a social safety-net program on persistent 
poverty may be low, even if it contributes substantially to reducing transitory poverty.  Using a two-
point (1987 and 1989) panel data set from Hungary, this study attempted to distinguish between the 
roles of protecting and promoting the poor, while evaluating the country’s cash benefit programs.  
The study’s findings suggest that, in the absence of safety-net interventions, the poverty rate would 
rise by 7.6 percentage points, with 6.6 percentage points due to the transition from non-poor to 
poor status between the two years and 1 percentage point due to the inability to move out of 
poverty.  Thus, this safety net was found to be more effective in preventing transient poverty than 
reducing chronic poverty.     
In contrast, Devereux (2002) found that a social safety-net program could alleviate both 
transitory and chronic poverty.  This study distinguishes among three dimensions of poverty—low-
labor  productivity,  vulnerability,  and  dependency—and  two  categories  of  anti-poverty 
intervention—livelihood promotion and livelihood protection.  Within this framework, social safety 
nets were seen as publicly-funded transfer programs with consumption smoothing, as opposed to 5 
 
mean-shifting, objectives.  Yet safety nets can have both protection and promotion effects.  Drawing 
lessons  from  three  case  studies  in  southern  Africa,  Devereux  (2002)  confirmed  that  even  tiny 
income transfers are often invested in income-generating activities, education, social networks, or 
the acquisition of productive assets, suggesting that these programs have both short- and long-term 
effects on household welfare.   
  One  of the world’s largest and most prominent, government-supported  social  safety-net 
programs is Mexico’s ongoing Education, Health, and Nutrition Program, known as PROGRESA 
(Programa de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación).  PROGRESA takes an integrated approach to reaching 
the  poor,  combining  education,  health,  and  nutrition  interventions  in  a  single  package.    The 
approach has succeeded in improving the poor’s capacity to lift them out of poverty (Skoufias, 
Davis,  and  Behrman  1999).    The  largest  poverty reduction  achieved  by  PROGRESA  has  been 
among  the  poorest  of  the  population  (Skoufias  2001).    In  addition  to  its  consumption  effects, 
PROGRESA has led to higher school enrollment for both boys and girls (Schultz 2000) and a 
reduction in stunted growth among children 1–3 years of age (Behrman and Hoddinott 2000).  The 
program appears well-targeted and welfare-augmenting for both short- and long-term indicators of 
welfare.  
  Most of the social safety-net programs currently in place in northwest Bangladesh aim to 
help  beneficiaries  cope  with  seasonal  deprivation  specifically  and  longer-term  poverty  more 
generally.    This  paper  aims  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  these  programs  in  mitigating  monga.  
Specifically, it examines programs’ coverage in the greater Rangpur area and their impact on food-
consumption patterns of poor households during monga and non-monga periods.  The analysis 
shows  that  social  safety-net  programs,  especially  those  administered  by  NGOs,  are  helpful  in 
mitigating seasonal, as well as year-round, food deprivation.  The extent of NGO outreach is twice 
that of government programs (about 20 percent versus 10 percent of the hard-core poor), which 6 
 
may explain  why  NGOs are more  effective  in mitigating  seasonal  deprivation in  the  northwest 
region.   
 
2.  Social Safety-net Operations in Bangladesh 
With annual per capita GDP growth at 6 percent over the past decade, Bangladesh has attained a 
substantial decline in headcount poverty.  In the early 1990s, headcount poverty was at 57 percent; 
the 26-percent decline over the subsequent 20 years (to 49 percent by 2000 and 31.5 percent by 
2010) occurred mainly in rural areas (35.2 rural versus 21.8 percent urban) (Table 1).  This is indeed 
a remarkable achievement for a country with a population of just 160 million. 
{TABLE 1 HERE} 
    Despite this progress, an estimated 56 million people—the approximate population size of 
the UK or France—remain impoverished in Bangladesh.  With a population growth rate of 1.5 
percent, creating adequate employment opportunities has been a major challenge.  A large share of 
per capita expenditure is clustered around the poverty line, meaning that vulnerability to poverty, 
hunger, and economic insecurity is high and increasingly common for the poor.  Moreover, such 
shocks as Cyclone Sidr in 2007 and food- and fuel-price increases during early 2008 are likely to 
have increased poverty (World Bank 2010). 
{TABLE 2 HERE} 
  In addition, Bangladesh’s poverty-reduction performance is not uniform across the country.  
Although overall poverty has declined, incidence of poverty is much higher in lagging regions.  For 
example, in 2005, the poverty rate was 40 percent country-wide, compared to 57.4 percent in the 
greater Rangpur region, which is also more vulnerable to natural disasters.  In addition to regional 
disparity, poverty varies by season.  Again, the greater Rangpur region exhibits the most pronounced 7 
 
seasonal variation in poverty (Table 2) (Khandker 2011).  Thus, it is an enormous challenge for 
Bangladesh to safeguard the economic security of the poor, especially in greater Rangpur. 
2.1  Bangladesh’s Safety-net Programs      
The  Government  of  Bangladesh  (GOB)  implements  its  safety-net  programs  through  various 
ministries, state divisions, and sometimes in collaboration with international donor organizations.  
One way to categorize these programs is by their duration.  For example, the GOB has both long- 
and  short-term  social  safety-net  measures.    Short-term  or  seasonal  programs  provide  poor 
households quick or emergency cash or food support to minimize the impact of natural disasters.  
Examples of such interventions are Food for Work (FFW) and Cash for Work (CFW).  Long-term 
programs,  on  the  other  hand,  are  continuous  measures  that  offer  both  cash  and  food  support 
throughout the year.  Examples are the Employment Generation Program for the Poorest (EGPP), 
Vulnerable  Group  Development  (VGD)  and  Vulnerable  Group  Feeding  (VGF).  Among  these 
programs, EGPP specifically address seasonal vulnerability and is one of the largest public safety net 
programs in Bangladesh.   
  VGD, a collaborative intervention jointly managed and implemented by the GOB and the 
World Food Program, is the world’s largest development intervention of its kind (Ahmed et al. 
2009).  Begun in 1975 as a relief program for families affected by natural calamities, the program 
today targets rural women exclusively, integrating food security and nutrition with development and 
income generation.  In 2005–06 alone, some 750,000 ultra-poor rural women received program 
support.  The generic VGD program operates through two components: Income Generation for 
Vulnerable Group Development (IGVGD), which covers 85 percent of total VGD beneficiaries, 
and Food Security for Vulnerable Group Development (FSVGD), covering 15 percent of VGD 8 
 
beneficiaries.  In addition to government support, NGOs and private organizations also contribute 
significantly to the country’s safety-net effort. 
  Beyond the better-known programs mentioned above, other successful programs include the 
older, ongoing Rural Maintenance Program (RMP), originally introduced in 1983 by CARE and now 
under the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives.  The RMP is a 
cash-for-work  program  that  provides  four  years  of  employment  in  rural-roads  maintenance  to 
female heads of households who are divorced, widowed, separated, or abandoned with little or no 
financial support.  Each RMP participant receives a wage of Tk.51 per day for 30 days in a month.  
The program disburses cash wages through direct transfers to participants’ bank accounts.  The 
compulsory savings requirement is Tk.10 per day, which is deducted by the banks before salaries are 
paid.  The savings can be withdrawn by the participants only after completing the four-year cycle.  
Besides providing cash, the RMP offers participants life-skills trainings, including the development 
of business skills; as well as health, nutrition, and women’s rights counseling. 
   In  February  2002,  the  GOB  and  WFP  together  introduced  a  new  program,  entitled 
Integrated  Food  Security  (IFS),  which  has  three  components:  Food  for  Asset  Creation  (FFA), 
Community Nutrition Initiative, and Training and Nutrition Centers (Ahmed et al. 2009).  The FFA 
component promotes human- and capital-resource development for the ultra-poor by (i) providing 
awareness and training in legal, social, health, and nutrition issues; (ii) enabling participants to work 
for  community  infrastructure  development  and  productive  asset  creation;  and  (iii)  providing 
marketable skills training for income-generating activities (IGAs).   It is required that at least 70 
percent of participants be women who are not already VGD beneficiaries.  FFA participants receive 
food and cash compensation for infrastructure development work  at various times of the year.  
Food and cash for work are usually provided from December to May, which is seasonally suitable 
for infrastructure development.  Entitlement for such work is a minimum wage of 2 kg of rice or 9 
 
wheat and Tk.15 per working day, provided a minimum amount of work is done.  Training in 
awareness-raising  and  IGAs  is  conducted  from  June  to  November.    A  participant’s  monthly 
entitlements for the training period are 20 kg of wheat or rice and Tk. 100.  Similar to the participant 
requirements of the IGVGD and FSVGD, saving is compulsory.  FFA participants are required to 
save Tk. 25 per month.  FFA follows a 12–24 month project cycle.  Although systematic program 
evaluations are seldom done, available research suggests that cash-transfer programs have helped to 
alleviate food and health insecurity, and in some cases have enabled beneficiaries to invest in small-
scale IGAs. 
{TABLE 3 HERE} 
  A study of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) demonstrates that, out 
of  four  programs  (IGVGD,  FSVGD,  FFA,  and  RMP),  transfer  as  a  percentage  of  household 
expenditure is highest for FFA, at 38.2 percent, followed by RMP (30.2 percent), IGVGD (15.5 
percent), and FSVGD (15.0) (Ahmed et al. 2009).  The same study finds that, among the four 
programs, FFA is the best targeted, helping 72 percent of its beneficiaries lift themselves above the 
poorest 10 percent of the population.  Using data from the 2000 and 2005 Household Income and 
Expenditure  Surveys  (HIESs),  Khandker  (2011)  finds  that  VGF  lowers  poverty  among  its 
beneficiaries, and that such programs as FFW lower both seasonal and chronic poverty (Table 3).  
2.2  Meeting the Safety-net Need 
Given Bangladesh’s wide range of safety-net programs, are there enough to meet its needs?  Driven 
by rapid urbanization and the breakdown of the extended family system, the country now faces new 
social-protection challenges, even as it struggles to tackle ongoing ones.  Most existing safety-net 
programs target the rural poor; thus, there is an urgent need to address the problems of the urban 
poor and other excluded groups, including the disabled and street children.  The GOB spent less 10 
 
than 1 percent of GDP on social safety-net programs till the end of 1990s, which was less than the 2 
percent allocated in Sub-Saharan Africa and far less than the 5 percent average allocation in South 
Asia (World Bank 2006, 2008).  However, the allocation has improved recently – GOB has allocated 
2.8 percent of the GDP on food-based safety net programs alone in FY09 budget (World Bank 
2008).  In  addition  to  the  various  GOB-supported  safety-net  programs  shown  in  Table  4,  the 
government also allocates substantial resources each year to natural-disaster relief programs.  Over 
the  12-year  period  shown  in  Table  4,  safety-net  allocations  have  expanded  significantly.  That 
expansion has been mostly due to increase in the VGD, VGF and GR and TR programs, although 
the budget in FFW has declined.  
{TABLE 4 HERE} 
   Government safety programs usually reach about 4–5 million households according to the 
World Bank report on the safety net programs in Bangladesh (World Bank 2006).  The report finds 
that approximately 10 percent of the poor are covered by a large number of programs.  However, 
the situation seems to have improved over the last few years. According to HIES data for 2005, 
national coverage of the social safety-net programs is only 13 percent (with 15.6 percent in the rural 
areas and only 5.5 percent in urban ones).  The same survey in 2010 finds the national coverage to 
have almost doubled to 25 percent (with the rural and urban coverage being about 30 percent and 9 
percent respectively).  While coverage is highest for the VGD and VGF programs (just under 7 
percent), the average benefit households receive from these programs is less than Tk.1000 (Figure 
1).  Conversely, the IFS program offers high average benefits, but coverage is quite low. 
{FIGURE 1 HERE} 
{FIGURE 2 HERE} 11 
 
  Until  2003–04,  the  government’s  allocation  for  both  seasonal  and  year-round  safety-net 
programs was fairly low and about the same, after which time the allocation to seasonal programs 
rose considerably, reaching Tk. 6 million per year by 2007–08, more than 10 times the amount 
allocated in 2003–04.  Over the same period, allocation to year-round programs increased by only 
half (Figure 2).  Thus, the relative importance of short-term versus longer-term programs is a point 
worth exploring. 
  
3.  Survey and Data Description 
This study is based on a large household survey conducted in the greater Rangpur region in 2006–07 
by the Institute of Microfinance (InM), with support from the Palli Karma Shahayak Foundation 
(PKSF), Bangladesh’s wholesale outlet for microfinance.  The InM survey aimed to identify the 
hard-core poor, the group most vulnerable to monga, and to design and implement appropriate 
mitigating interventions.
1  The survey covered roughly 70 percent of rural  residents in the greater 
Rangpur region,
2 and was conducted immediately following the 2006 monga season (September–
November).  A total of 482,928 households were surveyed, representing 23 sub-districts (upazilas) 
and some 2,300 villages; after data cleaning, 480,918 households were retained for the purpose of 
this paper’s analysis.  Survey data on the extent of seasonal food deprivation and coping mechanisms 
adopted by the poor to mitigate it were limited.     
  The  survey  characterized  poor  households  in  the  greater  Rangpur  region  by  a  high 
dependency  ratio (0.63),  a high  rate  of  wage  employment (54 percent), and  a low  rate  of  self-
employment (16 percent) (Table 5).
3  Since most of the poor are wage employed in  the agriculture 
                                                           
1 In the InM survey, the hard-core poor are defined as those households that own less than half an acre of land, whose 
monthly incomes do not exceed Tk. 1,500 (equivalent to US$22), or who sell labor for a daily wage. 
2  The  InM  survey  covered  all  five  of  the  greater  Rangpur  region’s  districts:  Kurigram,  Gaibandha,  Nilphamari, 
Lalmonirhat, and Rangpur.      
3 The dependency ratio is measured by a household’s proportion of non-working members. 12 
 
sector, they are likely to suffer the most from seasonality of agriculture.  As Table 5 shows, only 13 
percent of the poor have non-agricultural assets (e.g., rickshaw van), and about 49 percent have 
some type of agricultural asset (e.g., plough).  However, the poor are virtually landless (the average 
landholding is less than one-tenth of an acre).  These characteristics vary little across the region’s 
five districts. 
{TABLE 5 HERE} 
   As mentioned above,  both government and nongovernmental  safety-net programs assist 
those rural poor who are vulnerable to the seasonality of monga and, in response, tend to adopt 
desperate coping measures.  Given the extent of the crisis, however, it appears that government 
support is inadequate.  An examination of the government’s main social safety-net programs—
VGD, VGF, and Old Age Pension—reveals that only about 10 percent of rural households are 
covered (Figure 3).  Program coverage appears somewhat misplaced, with Kurigram, considered the 
most  impoverished  among  the  five  districts,  receiving  the  lowest  coverage.    Among  the  three 
programs, VGD and VGF have the highest coverage (6.3 percent), which is still quite inadequate. 
{FIGURE 3 HERE} 
  Membership in safety-net programs does not necessarily guarantee that households receive 
support during  the  monga  season.    Safety-net programs are grouped  into short-  and long-term 
programs (Table 6).  Only 9.6 percent of the rural poor are members of government-run, safety-net 
programs; about one-third of them receive no support from these programs during the monga 
period.  However, most members receive support from long-term, safety-net programs.  On the 
other hand, about one-quarter of the ultra-poor receive support from government-run, safety-net 
programs during the monga season, even though they are not members.  In sum, only 31.6 percent 
of the rural ultra-poor receive some form of government help during the monga period. 
{TABLE 6 HERE} 13 
 
  Given the inadequacy of safety-net support from government-run programs during monga, 
vulnerable households adopt a variety of coping mechanisms.  As Table 7 suggests, some 57 percent 
of  safety-net  program  recipients  adopt  some  type  of  coping  measure,  compared  to  49  percent 
among non-recipients.  Among members of government safety-net programs, about 55 percent 
adopt informal coping  mechanisms (e.g., advance  sale of labor or crop) and 6.5  percent  adopt 
formal means (e.g., borrowing from formal sources).  Seasonal migration is the major informal 
coping mechanism for the poor in the greater Rangpur region: 38.6 percent of safety-net program 
recipients and 34.8 percent of non-recipients adopt out-migration as a coping measure, suggesting 
that both groups remain equally vulnerable to monga. 
{TABLE 7 HERE} 
  We next examine the extent of the hardship that households in the greater Rangpur region 
are  subjected  to  during  the  monga  period.  The  InM  survey  lacks  data  on  household  food 
consumption; rather, it has an indicator variable reporting the status of meal consumption of the 
sampled households, as follows: (i) starvation (households go without meals for a day or more), (ii) 
meal rationing (households consume less than what they normally would in a day), and (iii) full meal 
consumption (households consume desired quantity of meals, which is usually three a day).  This 
information was collected from all households for both monga and non-monga periods.   
  A high percentage of the rural ultra-poor in the greater Rangpur region, with the exception 
of Nilphamari District, experienced starvation during the 2006 monga season (Table 8).  Overall, 
about 47 percent of poor households experienced starvation during monga, while only 4.4 percent 
had full meals during the same period.  Predictably, the rate of starvation during the non-monga 
period declined; however, it did not fall to zero; even during the non-monga season, 8.5 percent of 
households experienced starvation.  On the other hand, the share of households that consumed full 14 
 
meals rose to nearly 41 percent.  Also, about half the population rationed meals in both seasons, 
indicating a persistent form of food insecurity among the hard-core poor in the greater Rangpur 
region. 
{TABLE 8 HERE} 
   Does meal-consumption status vary by membership in safety-net programs or whether a 
household  receives  support  during  monga?  At  the  aggregate  level,  49.9  percent  of  recipient 
households and 46.1 percent of non-recipient households underwent occasional starvation during 
the  2006  monga  (Table 9),  meaning  that  the  extent  of  seasonal  deprivation  was  slightly  higher 
among safety-net beneficiaries, compared to non-beneficiaries.  This does not necessarily imply a 
negative effect of the safety-net programs, but merely indicates that safety-net beneficiaries are more 
vulnerable than their counterpart non-beneficiaries.  
{TABLE 9 HERE} 
{TABLE 10 HERE} 
  During  the  non-monga  season,  the  rate  of  starvation  was  lower  among  safety-net 
beneficiaries, compared to non-beneficiaries (Table 10).  Again, this does not necessarily imply a 
positive impact of the safety-net programs.  An impact assessment, discussed later in this paper, is 
required to handle the endogeneity issues regarding program placement and participation in the 
safety-net programs. 
 
4.  Determinants of Safety-net Support in Northwest Bangladesh 
As mentioned previously, the InM survey aimed to collect information on the hard-core poor in 
Bangladesh’s greater Rangpur region.  The targeting criteria (listed in footnote 1), according to the 
InM, were well enforced, but we cannot completely verify that claim as data on the monthly-income 15 
 
criterion was not collected.  We find that, during the monga period, less than one-third of the 
sampled households actually received benefits from one or more safety-net programs.  This finding 
perhaps has little to do with targeting efficiency, and is related more to constrained resources: There 
are simply not enough safety-net resources to provide for all who deserve it.  Thus, a key question is 
what determines household access to any safety-net program.  In this section, we examine various 
factors that might determine whether a household receives safety-net benefits.     
Because receipt of safety-net benefits can be represented as a binomial variable, a probit 
model is used to estimate it, which is expressed as follows: 

 
   
X
X dt t s prob

  ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ,  (1) 
where and  are the normal density distribution and the cumulative normal distribution functions, 
respectively;  X  is a  vector  of  household  and community  characteristics;  and  β  is  the  vector  of 
parameters to be determined.  Both household- and village-level characteristics are likely to affect 
the receipt of safety-net benefits during the monga season.  Among household-level factors, we 
consider  various  types  of  household  assets,  dependency  ratio,  and  the  age  and  education  of 
household  head.    The  village-level  variables  include  access  to  microcredit  programs  and  the 
unemployment rate.
4  Moreover, we use  several other location and agroclimate factors that can 
affect households’ vulnerability to monga and whether they are recipients of the safety-net resources 
disseminated: (i) average yearly rainfall at the upazila (sub-district) level, (ii) proportion of high land 
in  the  upzila,
5  and  (iii) whether  the village is  located  in  a char  area.
6  Finally, we control for 
                                                           
4 The rate of village-level unemployment has been defined by the proportion of households in the village whose heads 
are unemployed.  
5 According to the Bangladesh Agricultural Research Countil (BARC), a high land area is one where the flood-water level 
remains below a height of 3 feet. 
6 A char is a land area formed by river sediments that is then inhabited by homeless, destitute people.      16 
 
unobserved characteristics at the union level (rural micro areas below the upazila level) that may 
influence the probability of receiving safety-net benefits during the monga season. 
{TABLE 11 HERE} 
The  probit  results  of  equation  (1)  are  reported  in  Table  11,  which  also  presents  the 
descriptive statistics of the major explanatory variables used in the regression.  Such household-level 
variables as household head’s age and employment status, non-agricultural assets, and savings matter 
in terms of accessing social safety-net support.  For example, having a self-employed head reduces 
the household’s probability of receiving safety-net benefits during monga by 10.3 percent, while 
ownership of non-agricultural assets reduces it by 3 percent.  Conversely, having some household 
savings increases the probability of access to safety-net support.  Finally, households in a village with 
high  unemployment  are  likely  to  receive  more  benefits  than  those  in  a  village  with  low 
unemployment.  Households in a high-rainfall area, indicative of better agricultural opportunities, are 
likely to receive more benefits during monga.  Similarly, within the same rainfall area, those upazilas 
with a greater share of high lands are likely to receive more benefits.  However, having char land, an 
indicator of a village’s increased vulnerability due to poor agroclimate conditions, apparently does 
not influence deciding who receives support during monga.  But once the program is in place, 
having landholdings reduces the recipient’s safety-net support in areas with high land, high rainfall, 
and  char  land.    Thus,  the  findings  confirm  that  safety-net  programs  are  not  well  targeted  to 
vulnerable areas, even though poor households are likely to benefit more once villages gain access to 
the programs.  Support to the northwest region’s ultra-poor during monga is simply not enough, as 





5.  Estimating Program Impacts 
Given the coverage and size of and access to social safety-net schemes supported by both the 
government and NGOs, we raise an important policy question: Do safety-net programs help to 
alleviate starvation?  Constructing a counterfactual is key to answering this policy question and 
evaluating the intervention; that is, what would have happened to the starvation status of safety-net 
program  beneficiaries  had  they  not  received  such  support?    Randomized  design  of  an  ex-ante 
intervention, where beneficiaries are treated randomly with a program intervention, can help to 
create  the  counterfactual  against  which  this  key  policy  question  can  be  evaluated.    IFPRI,  in 
collaboration  with  the  Mexican  government,  adopted  such  a  rigorous,  randomized  evaluation 
technique to evaluate PROGRESA’s impact on education, nutrition, health, and rural poverty.  This 
evaluation  was  also  based  on  repeated  surveys  of  individuals  from  24,000  households  in  506 
localities  in  randomly  assigned  PROGRESA  and  non-PROGRESA  areas.    Formal  surveys, 
structured and semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and workshops were held in seven states 
where the program was first piloted.  However, such an extensive and innovative evaluation design 
is beyond the scope of this study.   
   In the absence of randomized design, we can rely on non-randomized evaluation techniques.  
For example, Ahmed et al. (2009) applied a propensity score technique to a cross-sectional survey of 
safety-net  beneficiaries  and  non-beneficiaries  to  determine  program  effects  based  on  observed 
characteristics.    The  weakness  of  this  method  is  that  it  omits  the  bias  due  to  unobserved 
characteristics influencing participation in safety-net programs.  A more defensible non-randomized 
method that accounts for the unobserved-variable bias is panel data, where the key assumption for 
identification  is  that  unobserved  heterogeneity  is  time  invariant.    Ravallion,  van  de  Walle,  and 
Gautam (1995) used this method in their study of safety-net programs in Hungary.  Unfortunately, 
we do not have panel household survey data for handling this endogeneity.   18 
 
What we do have is cross-sectional, ex-post data on recipients and non-recipients of safety-
net programs in the greater Rangpur region for both monga and non-monga periods.  With this 
data, we can compare such outcomes as starvation status between recipients and non-recipients; 
however,  we  cannot  establish  causality  between  receiving  the  safety-net  program  and  food 
deprivation.  Since a household’s seasonal food deprivation also depends on a host of other factors, 
it is important to control for all such factors (both observed and unobserved) to determine the 
impact of safety-net programs on seasonal hardship.  This is the challenge of an ex-post program 
evaluation using cross-sectional survey data.  
   In our evaluation scenario, we know only that less than one-third of the hard-core poor in 
the greater Rangpur region received the benefit of the social safety-net program during the 2006 
monga season due to supply-side constraints.  Household receipt of the safety-net program benefits 
is  not  exogenously  given.    To  control  for  endogeneity  of  program  benefits,  we  could  use  an 
instrumental variable regression technique, which requires one or more suitable instruments.  Such 
instruments would directly affect household receipt of safety-net benefits, but not seasonal food 
deprivation, which would only benefit indirectly through safety-net program benefits.  However, 
deciding on the appropriate instruments is not an easy task, and we do not have valid instruments to 
use in the instrumental variable method.  Alternately, we propose a two-step procedure that uses the 
endogenous switching regression proposed by Maddala (1983) to control for endogeneity of safety-
net program benefits with induced outcomes of our interest, such as extent of seasonal deprivation.  
5.1  Model Description 
We assume that si denotes whether household i receives safety-net benefits during the monga season 
(si  = 1 when household receives benefits, 0 when it does not), which is determined by the following 
selection model: 19 
 
         if  0   i i u Z  , then si = 1  and   (2) 
                                        if  0   i i u Z  , then si = 0,    (3) 
where  Zi    is  a  vector  of  household-  and  village-level  characteristics  that  determines  whether  a 
household receives safety-net program benefits during the monga season, γ is the parameter to be 
estimated,  and  ui  is  the  error  term.    We  further  assume  that  seasonal  food  deprivation  of  the 
recipients and non-recipients is expressed, as follows: 
i i i X C 1 1 1 1     , when a household benefits from the safety net (si = 1)  (4) 
i i i X C 0 0 0 0     , when a household does not benefit (si = 0),    (5) 
where  X1i  and  X0i  are  vectors  of  household-  and  village-level  characteristics  that  determine  a 
household’s food consumption when the household receives safety-net benefits and when it does 
not, respectively;  1   and  0   are parameters to be estimated; and  1   and  0  are the error terms.  The 
outcome equations include all the X variables used in the probit equation for receiving safety-net 
benefits, including the dummy variables for union to control for any local-level heterogeneity.  The 
error terms, i u ,  1  , and  0   are assumed to have a tri-variate normal distribution, with mean vector 
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1  , and 
2
0   are the variances of  i u ,   1  , and  0  , respectively; and   u 1  ,  u 0  , and  01   
are covariances of  1   and  i u ,  0   and  i u , and  0   and  1  , respectively.  In a switching regression 
model, outcome equations are run after controlling for a household’s selection bias. 20 
 
5.2  Outcomes Measuring Seasonal Food Deprivation  
From the food-consumption pattern of the households, we derive two outcomes measuring seasonal 
food deprivation.  The first one is starvation, which is an extreme form of hardship.  The second, 
general  food  deprivation,  is  constructed  by  combining  starvation  and  meal  rationing;  that  is,  a 
household undergoes general food deprivation if it starves or rations meals. 
  As Table 12 illustrates, a household’s land and various non-land assets reduce its probability 
of seasonal food deprivation, regardless of whether it receives safety-net program support.  For 
example, a 10-percent increase in land assets reduces seasonal starvation by 3.6 percentage points 
and general food deprivation by 0.9 percentage points for recipients of safety-net benefits.  Similarly, 
it is observed that land assets reduce seasonal starvation for non-recipients of safety-net benefits, 
albeit to a lesser extent.  Having a self-employed household head lowers a safety-net recipient’s 
probability of starvation during monga by 4.9 percentage points, without affecting other outcomes.  
Having a wage-employed head, on the other hand, increases general food deprivation during monga 
for both recipient and non-recipient households.  Among the location characteristics, being situated 
in an area with high land or adequate rainfall reduces a household’s seasonal deprivation, regardless 
of the status of its safety-net benefit. 
{TABLE 12 HERE} 
   In addition to regression coefficients, Table 12 reports 1  , 0  ,  1  , and  0  , where the last 
two terms are the correlation coefficients between  1   and  i u , and  0   and  i u , respectively.  The 
same  signs  of  1    and  0    indicate  that  the  unobserved  factors  that  influence  a  household’s 
probability of receiving safety-net benefits also affect its seasonal food deprivation in the same way; 
the  opposite  signs  of  1    and  0    indicate  that  unobserved  factors  have  opposite  effects on  a 21 
 
household’s probability of receiving safety-net benefits and food deprivation status.  Table 12 also 
reports the inverse Mill’s ratio (λ), which estimates the normal density function over the cumulative 








, calculated from the first-stage equation.  The inclusion 
of λ in the outcome equation controls for the unobserved factors (endogeneity bias) that influence a 
household’s probability of receiving safety-net benefits in the first place.  Since λ is highly statistically 
significant, the dependent variable (a household’s starvation and general food deprivation) is indeed 
affected by the endogeneity of safety-net support. 
5.3  Program Effects on Seasonal Food Deprivation     
While we have shown in Table 12 the determinants of seasonal food deprivation for recipients and 
non-recipients of safety-net support, we have not yet shown the potential impacts of  safety-net 
support on seasonal food deprivation.  To do so, we construct, in accordance with the derivation of 
Lokshin and Sajaia (2004), the following terms: 
) ( / ) ( ) , | ( _ i i 1 1 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 1 Z Z x x 1 s y E yc             
= conditional expected value of seasonal food deprivation of a recipient household (i.e., it received 
the safety-net benefits); 
) ( / ) ( ) , | ( _ i i 0 0 0 i 1 i 1 i 0 i 1 0 Z Z x x 1 s y E yc             
=  conditional  expected  value  of  seasonal  food  deprivation  of  a  recipient  household had  it  not 
received the safety-net benefits, (counterfactual); 
)] ( /[ ) ( ) , | ( _ i i 0 0 0 i 0 i 0 i 0 i 0 0 Z 1 Z x x 0 s y E yc              
= conditional expected value of seasonal food deprivation of a non-recipient household (i.e., it did 
not receive the safety-net benefits); and 22 
 
)] ( /[ ) ( ) , | ( _ i i 1 1 1 i 0 i 0 i 1 i 0 1 Z 1 Z x x 0 s y E yc              
= conditional  expected value of seasonal  food deprivation of a non-recipient household  had it 
received the safety-net benefits (counterfactual). 
Here   and   are the normal density distribution and cumulative normal distribution functions, 
respectively.   
  Based on the above calculations, we construct the impacts of safety-net program benefits on 
household outcomes, as follows: 
i i i yc yc yc 1 _ 0 1 _ 1 1 _  
 =  
[expected outcome of recipient household – expected outcome of recipient household had it not 
received the benefits (counterfactual)] = change in outcome of a migrant household due to safety-
net program benefits. 
i i i yc yc yc 0 _ 0 0 _ 1 0 _   =  
[expected  outcome  of  a  non-recipient  household  had  it  received  the  safety-net  benefits 
(counterfactual) – expected outcome of a non-recipient household] = change in outcome of a non-
recipient household due to safety-net program benefits had it received such benefits.    
  We  can  also  compare  the  expected  outcome  gains  between  recipient  and  non-recipient 
households by taking a second-order difference, expressed as follows: 
i i i yc yc yc 0 _ 1 _ _    
From the counterfactual comparison, it is obvious that safety-net support reduces seasonal 
hardship for both recipient and non-recipient households (Table 13).  The expected reduction in 
monga-time starvation for recipient households is 4.4 percentage points (which are accrued to them) 23 
 
and 2.5 percentage points for non-recipient households (which would have accrued to them had 
they  received  safety-net  benefits).    Similarly,  a  household’s  general  food  deprivation  during  the 
monga period decreases by 3.9 percentage points for recipient households and by 5.2 percentage 
points for non-recipient households as a result of having received safety-net benefits.   
{TABLE 13 HERE} 
  An important finding from this analysis is that the accrued benefit to recipient households is 
higher than that to non-recipient households for starvation, while for general food deprivation non-
recipients appear to have benefited more.  This clearly points to the underlying differences between 
recipient  and  non-recipient  households.    Regardless  of  household  type,  however,  this  exercise 
unequivocally  establishes  the  benefits  of  safety-net  programs  with  regard  to  seasonal  food 
deprivation.  Extending the analysis to estimating potential impacts on non-monga outcomes, we 
find from the similar results presented in Table 13 that safety-net access reduces starvation by 1.2 
percentage points and general deprivation by 0.4 percentage points.    
5.4  Measured Benefits and Support Type   
Thus far, we have not differentiated between government and NGO interventions to support the 
ultra-poor  in  the  greater  Rangpur  region  during  the  monga  season.    As  previously  mentioned, 
government programs account for only 10 percent of coverage, while NGO coverage is more than 
twice that amount, at 21 percent.  Thus, we questioned whether the measured benefits resulted from 
NGO support.  To answer this question, we repeated our exercise by limiting the samples first to 
households who were beneficiaries of government-supported programs and second to those who 
were not (excluding those who received NGO support) (Table 14). 
{TABLE 14 HERE} 24 
 
  The results suggest that membership in government-supported programs contributes little to 
reducing starvation during monga, but does help to reduce hunger during the non-monga period.  
Perhaps this explains why safety-net support during monga was insufficient to substantially reduce 
seasonal hardship, but did help to alleviate it, albeit inadequately, during the non-monga period.  
Nonetheless, both sets of results clearly show that safety-net programs affect both transitory and 
chronic  poverty,  which  is  consistent  with  the  findings  of  Devereux  (2002)  for  poor  African 
countries and unlike those of Ravallion, van de Walle, and Gautam (1995).
7            
 
6.  Summary and Conclusion 
The  basic  objective  of  this  paper  has  been  to  assess  the  role  of  social  safety-net  programs  in 
mitigating seasonal deprivation (monga) using recent survey data of hard-core poor households in 
the greater Rangpur region of Bangladesh.  We have also explored whether safety-net programs, 
which are overwhelmingly seasonal in nature, can avert the consequences of seasonal shocks or 
seasonality of income and employment.  Although the extent of program coverage is limited by the 
availability of funds, we find that programs, where in place, are well-targeted.  However, program 
inputs are not distributed in accordance with the perceived notion of area-specific poverty incidence.  
We also find that some programs, such as Old Age Allowance, are year-round, reaching the most 
vulnerable  groups  (e.g.,  the  elderly).    Interestingly,  the  distribution  of  program  benefits  is  not 
random but is determined by a host of factors, including a household’s physical and human assets, 
plus the availability of alternative programs (e.g., microfinance in the vicinity of potential program 
beneficiaries).   
  Interestingly, the results of our impact assessments show that safety-net programs have a 
positive effect on mitigating monga.  More importantly, the programs mitigate both seasonal and 
                                                           
7 We also tried to differentiate the potential effects of short-term versus long-term safety-net measures; however, the 
sample size for long-term measures was too small to run separate regressions and thus separate estimates.    25 
 
non-seasonal starvation.  These findings are consistent with those of IFPRI in Mexico and Devereux 
in African countries.  Given the effectiveness of these programs, it is probably correct to argue that 
their coverage should be expanded; that is, program deepening should be increased.  We also find 
that NGO participation has made it possible to expand program coverage in the greater Rangpur 
region in recent years.  Even so, there is a need to deepen programs in terms of both coverage and 
size.  This is apparent, given that households are found to adopt other methods besides social safety 
nets to cope with seasonal deprivation.  Moreover, the expansion of government-supported social 
safety-net programs can effectively contribute to mitigating monga, provided such programs are 
well-coordinated with those of NGOs.     
  Since the annual recurrence of monga in Bangladesh’s greater Rangpur region is a function 
of the seasonality of agriculture, the safety-net approach may not offer a permanent cure.  Also 
needed are ways to enhance the income and productivity of the poor through income diversification 
that includes rural non-farm income, as well as remittances from seasonal out-migration.  At the 
same time, investments in physical infrastructure and human capital must be increased to facilitate 
the transition to a more diversified economy.  In sum, social safety nets can be viewed as a quick fix 
to reduce the severity of seasonal deprivation in the northwest region, but the longer-term solution 
rests on promoting the income and productivity of the poor.    26 
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Figure 1: Safety-net program coverage 
 
Source: HIES (2005). 30 
 
Figure 2: Trend in yearly allocation for seasonal and year-round safety-net programs 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh. 31 
 
Figure 3: Coverage of government safety-net programs in greater Rangpur 
 













2000  2010  2000  2005 
Whole country  48.9  31.5  34.3  17.6 
Rural  52.3  35.2  37.9  21.1 
Urban  35.1  21.3  19.9  7.7 
Greater Rangpur  67.7  42.3  55.9  27.7 
Sources: HIES (2000, 2010). 33 
 
Table 2: Distribution of rural food poverty and extreme poverty, by season 
 
Season 
Greater Rangpur (%)  Rest of country (%)  Whole country (%) 
2000  2005  2000  2005  2000  2005 
Monga  FP = 93.0 
EP = 66.0 
FP = 88.3 
EP = 48.3 
FP = 86.4 
EP = 43.9 
FP = 83.4 
EP = 31.6 
FP = 86.9 
EP = 45.6 
FP = 83.8 
EP = 33.0 
Non-monga  FP = 79.5 
EP = 52.3 
FP = 76.8 
EP = 43.0 
FP = 79.6 
EP = 38.4 
FP = 76.3 
EP = 28.6 
FP = 79.6 
EP = 39.7 
FP = 76.4 
EP = 29.9 
Year-round  FP = 82.6 
EP = 55.5 
FP = 79.5 
EP = 44.2 
FP = 81.5 
EP = 39.9 
FP = 78.2 
EP = 29.4 
FP = 81.6 
EP = 41.8 
FP = 78.5 
EP = 31.1 
No. observations  440  520  4,600  5,520  5,040  6,040 
Source: Khandker (2011). 
Note: FP = food poverty, EP = extreme poverty. 34 
 


















Women able to 
work  
Work  Cash  Public works program; average 








Schooling  Cash  Program to promote school 
enrollment and attendance, reduce 







Schooling  Cash  Program to promote and encourage 
continuing education for females. 
Old Age Allowance  Households with 
elderly members 
unable to work 




Cash  Allowance to reduce vulnerability of 
households with elderly members in 
non-municipal areas; average 
payment is Tk. 165 per month.  
Food for Work 
(FFW) 
Individuals able to 
work 






Food transfer program to reduce 
food vulnerability among the poor; 
in 2003, provided food in exchange 
for some 75 million hours of work. 
Test Relief  Individuals able to 
work  




and bushes    
Food 
grain  
Food transfer program to reduce 
food vulnerability among poor 
individuals and households in rural 













Food transfer program that trains 
vulnerable groups in life and work 
skills; as of June 2004, had provided 











Food transfer program that offers 
post-disaster food relief to selected 
households; during the 1998 flood, 











Key government, food-transfer 
program offering vulnerable groups 
immediate, short-term relief 
following natural and other 
disasters; much smaller program 
than the VGD or VGF. 
Source: World Bank (2006).  
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Table 4: Financial allocations for major safety net programs (Million Tk.) 
 















Food for Work (FFW)  8,060  6,728  2,047  2,197  2,609  5,097  6,224 
Gratuities Relief (GR) & Test Relief (TR)  2,280  2,319  1,896  2,687  3,019  5,839  6,784 
Vulnerable Group Development (VGD)  2,720  2,367  1,751  2,447  2,859  3,270  3,681 
Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)  2,290  1,250  1,490  1,883  5,643  6,028  7,840 
Allowance for Widow  250  239  777  1,022  1,522  1,820  1,616 
Honorarium for Freedom Fighters  150  275  155  318  503  1,572  2,090 
Old Age Allowance  490  477  1,555  2,385  3,136  4,451  4,346 
Primary Education Stipend Project (PESP)  0  954  3,749  3,356  3,270  3,158  4,293 
          Source: World Bank (2008) and Ministry of Planning. 





















Dependency ratio  0.65  0.64  0.63  0.63  0.57  0.63 
Land (decimals)  8.80  8.21  9.71  6.65  6.25  8.20 
Has agricultural asset  0.30  0.59  0.55  0.49  0.56  0.49 
Has non-agricultural 
asset 
0.16  0.11  0.13  0.11  0.13  0.13 
Has savings  0.43  0.34  0.28  0.26  0.32  0.34 
Has cow  0.29  0.27  0.30  0.19  0.21  0.26 
Head is self-
employed 
0.21  0.15  0  0.30  0.20  0.16 
Head is wage 
employed 
0.44  0.65  0.73  0.57  0.23  0.54 
No. observations  120,426   128,987  102,866  56,772  71.867  480,918 
Source: InM survey (2006–07).          
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Table 6: Household distribution in greater Rangpur: Membership in safety-net program 
versus receipt of support during monga (%)  
Source: InM survey data (2006–07). 
Note: Long-term programs are VGD, VGF and Old Age Allowance; short-term programs are TR and FFW.     




Table 7: Coping mechanisms adopted during monga by recipients and non-recipients of 
safety-net benefits     
Coping  
type 
Recipients of support 
during monga (%) 
Non-recipients of support 
during monga (%) 
Informal  54.6  46.4 
    Advance sale of labor  6.0  3.6 
    Advance sale of crop  0.5  0.5 
    Sale of asset  14.5  9.9 
    Out-migration  38.6  34.8 
    Borrowing from informal sources   15.9  10.7 
Formal  6.5  5.5 
    Borrowing from formal sources   6.5  5.5 
Any type  57.2  49.1 
No. observations  152,317  328,601 
Source: InM survey data (2006–007). 
 




























Received support  5.3  0.7  0.1  25.5  31.6  328,601 
Did not receive 
support  
2.7  0.8  0  67.9  71.4  152,317 
Total  8.0  1.5  0.1  90.4  100.0  480,918 
No. observations  38,476  7,143  695  434,604  480,918     37 
















Starvation  48.47  57.62  26.16  47.95  56.34  47.27 
Meal rationing  50.14  40.79  60.37  49.54  40.35  48.29 
Consumption of full 
meals 
1.39  1.59  13.47  2.51  3.31  4.44 
Non-monga period 
Starvation  2.08  12.18  2.32  14.36  17.10  8.53 
Meal rationing  49.36  63.44  32.89  54.78  53.33  50.85 
Consumption of full 
meals 
48.56  24.38  64.79  30.86  29.57  40.62 
No. observations  120,426   128,987  102,866  56,772  71.867  480,918 
Source: InM survey data (2006–07). 
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Table 9: Household meal-consumption status during monga by membership status in safety-net program 



















Source: InM survey data (2006–07). 
 
Support  
status during  
monga 
Member of  
long-term  
program only 
Member of  
short-term  
program only 





























































No. observations  38,476  7,143  695  434,604  480,918   39 
Table 10: Household meal-consumption status during non-monga by membership status in safety-net program 



























Member of  
































































No. observations  38,476  7,143  695  434,604     40 










Household level     








































Village or sub-district level     
















Village located in char area  -0.005 
(0.024) 
0.19 
(0.39)   41 





Average annual rainfall (mm) in upazila * log land 










Pseudo R2  0.050   
Log likelihood  -285,258.5   
No. observations  480,918 
     Source: InM survey data (2006–07). 
Note:  Figures  in  parentheses  are  standard  deviations  for  mean  column  and  standard  errors  for  marginal  impact 
column; ** and * indicate respective significance levels of 5 and 10 percent or better.  The regression also includes 
dummies to control for unobserved fixed effects at the union level.       42 
Table 12: Switching regression estimates of household food deprivation 


















Household level         
















































































Village or sub-district level         
Villagers have access to  
































(0.077)   43 
 


















Proportion of high land in upazila * log land 










Average annual rainfall (mm) in upazila * log 

















Wald χ2 (33)  1,656.15  484.01 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -521,208.51  -109,841.56 
















No. observations  480,918 
Source: InM survey data (2006–07). 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors; ** and * indicate respective significance levels of 5 and 10 percent or better.  The 
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Table 13: Impact of support received during monga on household food deprivation  
(N = 480, 918) 
Household  
type   
 
Starvation 
General food  
deprivation 























During non-monga period 






















    Source: InM survey data (2006–07).   
Note: Results are based on the switching regression reported in Table 12.  Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors;  
** indicates a significance level of 5 percent or better.     
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Table 14: Impact of membership in safety-net programs on household food deprivation 
(N = 357, 863) 
Household 
membership type   
 
Starvation 
General food  
deprivation 


















































Source: InM survey data (2006–07).  
Note: Results are based on a switching regression similar to the one reported in Table 12.  Figures in parentheses are robust 
standard errors; ** indicates a significance level of 5 percent or better.  The sample excludes households that received support 
during monga but were not members of the three major safety-net programs.          
     
 
 